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INTRODUCTION 
The legal theory of contributory copyright infringement requires a 
balancing of the competing interests of copyright holders and society. 
When a company distributes a product or service capable of both legal 
and illegal uses, the copyright holders seek broad enforcement of their 
rights and the distributors seek absolution based on the public benefits 
derived from the technological innovation.2 The Supreme Court, in an 
                                                                                                             
 1 The term “grok” was coined by the author Robert Heinlein in the science fiction 
novel Stranger in a Strange Land; it means “to understand thoroughly and intuitively.”  
WEBSTER’S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 842 
(1996). 
 †  J.D. candidate 2007, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2003, University 
of Georgia; B.S., 2003, University of Georgia. The author extends her special thanks to 
Professor Jake Barnes for his ideas and contributions to the composition of this comment. 
Also, she would like to thank her family and, in particular, Liam Holland and Christopher 
Miller for their support and inspiration during the writing process 
 2 In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 651 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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effort to balance these competing interests, has stated that the distributor 
of a product or service capable of substantial noninfringing uses is not 
liable as a contributory infringer; however, that seminal decision is laden 
with cumbersome language.3 In recent years, the Ninth and Seventh 
Circuits split regarding certain aspects of the Sony rule.4 Despite the 
opportunity to clarify the rule and resolve that circuit split, the Supreme 
Court sidestepped the issue entirely.5 Instead, the Court created a new 
rule that holds companies liable for purposely encouraging 
infringement.6 Already, lower courts have applied the Grokster 
inducement rule.7 It is only a matter of time before another case 
involving new technology requires a clarification of Sony in order to 
strike a balance between the interests of society and copyright holders. 
By applying tort law reasoning to the theory of contributory 
copyright infringement, this comment clarifies the Sony rule for the 
lower courts.8 Contributory copyright infringement is a tort; thus, tort 
law principles should apply.9 The Restatement bifurcates the intent 
requirement in tort law,10 just as Sony and Grokster bifurcate the intent 
requirement for contributory copyright infringement.11 Although the 
Court’s cumbersome language in Sony has created a circuit split, it does 
so in an effort to articulate a substantial certainty limitation.12 In some 
instances, such as the one at issue in Sony, the Court will limit a 
company’s liability if the product it distributes has substantial 
noninfringing uses.13 The exact definition of the word “substantial” has 
                                                                                                             
 3 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984). 
 4 Aimster, 334 F.3d at 649 (citing 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 6.1.2, p. 6:12-1 
(2d ed. 2003)); MGM Studios, Inc v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1162 n.9 (9th Cir. 
2004) [hereinafter Grokster I]. 
 5 MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2778-79 (2005) [hereinafter 
Grokster]. 
 6 Id. at 2779. 
 7 See MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 
1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Monotype Imaging, Inc. v. Bitstream, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 
2d 877 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
 8 For further discussion of the application of tort law principles to secondary liability 
in copyright law, see the works of Professors Yen and Barnes. See David W. Barnes, An 
Alternative Torts Model of Secondary Copyright Liability, 55 CASE. W. RES. 867 (2005); 
see also Alfred C. Yen, Law, Technology & the Arts Symposium: “Copyright and 
Personal Copying: Sony v. Universal Studios Twenty-one Years Later”: Sony, Tort 
Doctrines, and the Puzzle of Peer-to-Peer, 55 CASE W. RES. L. Rev. 815 (2005). 
 9 Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 10 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001). 
 11 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984). 
 12 Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. 
 13 Id. 
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proved problematic for plaintiffs as well as the lower courts.14 This 
comment argues that the Court’s language in Sony actually incorporates 
the Restatement’s suggestions regarding substantial certainty in 
intentional torts. In the comments accompanying section one of the Third 
Restatement, the drafters recommend a balancing test as a limitation on 
liability despite a substantial certainty that harm will occur.15 The 
reasoning behind that recommendation mirrors the language in Sony.16 
Thus, an application of the substantial certainty limitation of intentional 
tort liability to contributory copyright infringement cases will provide the 
balance between the progress of technology and the rights of copyright 
holders sought by Sony and, ultimately, entrusted to the determination of 
the lower courts. 
Part I provides a detailed review of the relevant case law, 
particularly the Supreme Court’s opinions in both Sony and Grokster. 
This section states the governing rules and discusses the diverging circuit 
court opinions. Part I also highlights the Court’s determination to balance 
the interests of copyright holders against the public’s interest in 
technological innovation. This section provides the background 
information necessary to understand subsequent sections. 
Part II expounds upon the dual objectives of copyright law and 
discusses its origins in the Constitution. This section also discusses the 
links between contributory infringement and tort law. That theory 
“originates in tort law and stems from the notion that one who directly 
contributes to another’s infringement should be held accountable.”17 
However, when a product or service is capable of lawful and illegal uses, 
the “Sony[] rule limits imputing [the] culpable intent” to commit 
contributory infringement based on product distribution.18 Since its 
pronouncement, the Sony rule has caused a great deal of difficulty. The 
circuits have split regarding their interpretation of the Sony rule; the 
Supreme Court refused to provide guidance for the lower courts.19 The 
tort law definition of intent provides the much-needed clarity. 
Part III clarifies the Sony rule. The first sub-section discusses the 
Restatement’s approach to intent in tort law and applies that principle to 
contributory copyright infringement. In particular, the Restatement 
explains that “[a] person acts with the intent to produce a consequence if: 
(a) The person has the purpose of producing that consequence; or (b) The 
                                                                                                             
 14 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2778. 
 15 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001). 
 16 Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. 
 17 Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 18 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2779. 
 19 Id. 
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person knows to a substantial certainty that the consequence will ensue 
from the person’s conduct.”20 Similarly, Sony and Grokster provide two 
situations in which a defendant may possess the intent to commit 
contributory infringement.21 The Restatement also makes many careful 
qualifications concerning its definition. As evinced by the Sony 
litigation, despite knowledge to a substantial certainty, a defendant “may 
be engaging in a generally proper activity for generally proper reasons, 
even though the activity produces harm as an unavoidable but unwanted 
byproduct.”22 In those situations, the Restatement limits liability unless 
the defendant has a substantial certainty that his conduct will affect a 
particular victim or those contained in a small class of victims within a 
localized area.23 The Restatement also provides specific examples of 
industries that qualify for the substantial certainty limitation.24 
Those industrial examples support the argument that the substantial 
certainty limitation actually creates a balancing test for the protection and 
promotion of industries serving the public good. In addition, the 
limitation is inspired, at least in part, by the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts’ discussion of negligence.25 Prior to the Restatement, the courts 
considered this balancing test to be good public policy. The courts have 
applied this test in the context of the railroad industry, an example 
enumerated in the Restatement. In those instances, the social benefits 
derived from that industry outweigh the harmful consequences of 
operating a railroad. Thus, the substantial certainty limitation applies 
when a defendant’s (an industry or software provider) conduct provides a 
net social benefit despite a substantial certainty of some harmful 
consequences. 
A desire to punish the guilty, rather than the knowing, justifies the 
substantial certainty limitation. Although companies do not desire their 
railroads to cause serious bodily injury, such injuries will likely occur 
regardless. Despite knowledge, the company lacks a subconscious, 
blameworthy intent. On the other hand, if a company knows to a 
substantial certainty that its business will cause the serious injury or 
death of an employee, “a particular victim, or . . . someone within a small 
class of potential victims within a localized area,”26 that company is 
liable, because its knowledge is not general but reveals a more blame-
                                                                                                             
 20 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1. 
 21 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780; Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. 
 22 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. a. 
 23 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e. 
 24 Id. 
 25 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e, reporter’s notes. 
 26 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e. 
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worthy mental state. Thus, the substantial certainty limitation ensures 
that only those people/entities that demonstrate a clear intent (established 
by their purpose or knowledge) will face liability. 
The last sub-section explains that the substantial certainty limitation 
provides a point of balance between the interests of copyright owners 
and the public’s interest in technological innovation. When applying the 
Restatement’s theory of intent, as well as its limitations to contributory 
copyright infringement, two scenarios result in liability. One represents 
Grokster and occurs when an entity purposefully induces copyright 
infringement. The second scenario represents Sony and occurs when an 
entity distributes a product (or provides a service) capable of infringing 
and noninfringing uses. In the latter instance, the substantial certainty 
limitation focuses liability on entities with a culpable state of mind. 
Application of the substantial certainty limitation requires two steps. 
First, the court must ask if “the defendant has knowledge to a substantial 
certainty that [its] conduct will bring about harm to a particular victim, or 
to someone within a small class of potential victims.”27 If the answer is 
yes, the defendant will face liability based on its intent to cause harm. If 
the answer is no, the court must balance the social benefits derived from 
the product against the harm it produces. If the product or service creates 
a net social benefit, the court should limit liability: society’s interest in 
technological innovation is served. If the product or service does not, the 
court will impose liability: copyright holders are protected. Thus, the 
substantial certainty limitation clarifies the Sony rule and helps the courts 
balance artists’ and society’s competing interests. 
I. CONTRIBUTORY COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT: REVIEW OF THE 
RELEVANT CASE LAW 
Because the subsequent discussion of contributory copyright 
infringement requires a detailed understanding of the relevant case law, 
this section provides a review of the two most influential Supreme Court 
decisions on the subject as well as a discussion of the current circuit split. 
In 1984, the Supreme Court faced a challenging issue: when is the 
distributor of a product capable of both lawful and unlawful uses liable 
for contributory copyright infringement? A deeply divided Court ruled 
that the distributor of a product capable of substantial noninfringing uses 
is not liable.28 The rule proved troublesome as technology advanced. The 
Seventh and Ninth Circuits split regarding their interpretation of the rule 
and each issued opinions criticizing the other. Then approximately 
                                                                                                             
 27 Id. 
 28 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984). 
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twenty years after the Court issued the Sony rule, the Supreme Court 
faced the issue once again. However, rather than clarify the Sony rule, 
the Court issued a new rule: one who purposefully induces infringement 
is a contributory copyright infringer.29 The Court neither clarified the 
Sony rule nor addressed the contentious circuit split. Subsequent sections 
of this comment provide a clarification, based on those two rules. Thus, 
further discussion requires a thorough understanding of contributory 
copyright infringement jurisprudence. 
A. The Betamax Case 
When Sony released its Betamax video-recorder (“VCR”) the 
copyright holders of many television programs, viewed the change as an 
abrogation of their rights.30 As a result, Universal Studios and other 
copyright holders (plaintiffs) brought an action for contributory 
copyright infringement against Sony in a California district court in 
1976.31 The plaintiffs argued that Sony, because of its product marketing 
and distribution, was responsible for the direct infringement of its users, 
who copied their television programs without authorization.32 The district 
court ruled in favor of Sony, because the company had no direct 
involvement with the purchasers and the company’s advertising did not 
induce such infringement.33 Though “[t]he District Court assumed that 
Sony had constructive knowledge of the probability that the [VCR] . . . 
would be used to record copyrighted programs, [it] found that Sony 
merely sold a ‘product capable of a variety of uses, some of them 
allegedly infringing.’”34 The plaintiffs appealed the district court’s final 
judgment.35 Since the VCR was sold for the exclusive purpose of 
reproducing television programs, which are typically copyrighted, the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that the VCR did not have substantial 
noninfringing uses.36 The Ninth Circuit also rejected the district court’s 
reasoning regarding Sony’s lack of knowledge “because the reproduction 
                                                                                                             
 29 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780. 
 30 Sony, 464 U.S. at 457 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 31 Id. at 420 (majority opinion). 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 426. 
 34 Id. (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 
461 (C.D. Cal. 1979)). According to user surveys, most users primarily employed the 
VCR for “time-shifting,” which “is the practice of recording a program to view it once at 
a later time, and thereafter erasing it.”  Id. at 423. However, a substantial number of users 
also employed the VCR as a means of accumulating libraries of videotaped 
programming. Id. at 423. Sony also warned its customers, by way of the Betamax 
instruction manual, about videotaping copyrighted material. Id. at 426. 
 35 Id. at 427. 
 36 Id. at 428. 
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of copyrighted materials was either ‘the most conspicuous use’ or ‘the 
major use’ of the . . . product.”37 The Supreme Court granted a writ of 
certiorari.38 
Justice Stevens’s majority opinion addresses the major concerns of 
copyright law and offers an equitable conclusion for the Sony issue. In 
particular, Justice Stevens provides a detailed overview of copyright law, 
its origins and applications, as well as a thoughtful summary of the 
relationship between copyright law and technology.39 The majority also 
speaks of policy, specifically “[t]he judiciary’s reluctance to expand the 
protections afforded by the copyright without explicit legislative 
guidance.”40 Of course, the Court issued a caveat: when Congress has not 
spoken, the courts must balance the competing interests of the copyright 
holder and the public.41 Sony was such an instance of congressional 
silence.42 Therefore, the Court modified a rule from patent law to reflect 
the unique concerns of copyright law: “the sale of copying equipment . . . 
does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely 
used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be 
capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”43 
Once the Court established this new rule, it applied the facts of the 
case.44 First, Justice Stevens explained that authorized time-shifting is 
noninfringing, fair use of copyrighted material; thus, it “plainly satisfies 
[the] standard.”45 The majority also found that “the evidence concerning 
‘sports, religious, educational and other programming’ . . . establish[ed] a 
significant quantity of broadcasting whose copying is now authorized, 
                                                                                                             
 37 Id. (quoting Universal City Studios Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 976 
(9th Cir. 1982)). 
 38 Id. at 420. 
 39 Id. at 428-30. Indeed, “[t]he fortunes of the law of copyright have always been 
closely connected with freedom of expression, on the one hand, and with technological 
improvements in means of dissemination, on the other.” Id. at 430 n.12 (quoting B. 
KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT vii-viii (Columbia University Press 1967)). 
 40 Id. at 431. 
 41 Id. at 432. 
 42 Id. at 434-35. The Copyright Act does not expressly define contributory 
infringement. Id. at 434. 
 43 Id. at 442 (emphasis added). 
 44 Id. The majority opinion becomes confusing once the Court applied the rule to the 
facts. As Justice Stevens notes, “we need only consider whether on the basis of the facts . 
. . a significant number of [the product’s potential uses] would be noninfringing.”  Id. at 
442 (emphasis added). Justice Blackmun articulates similar language in his dissenting 
opinion: “if a significant portion of the product’s use is noninfringing, the manufacturers 
and sellers cannot be held contributorily liable for the product’s infringing uses.”  Id. at 
491 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The subtle differences between the 
majority and the dissent in Sony may have led to the subsequent circuit split as different 
judges emphasized different language. 
 45 Id. at 442-43. 
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and a significant potential for future authorized copying.”46 In light of 
these facts, the Court ultimately found the VCR capable of substantial 
noninfringing uses.47 
Justice Blackmun, with whom Justices Marshall, Powell, and 
Rehnquist joined, composed a separate dissent.48 After a detailed review 
of copyright law and the doctrine of fair use,49 Justice Blackmun 
considered the claim of contributory copyright infringement.50 In 
response to the lower courts’ rulings, Justice Blackmun noted that “a 
finding of contributory infringement has never depended on actual 
knowledge of particular instances of infringement; it is sufficient that the 
defendant have reason to know that infringement is taking place.”51 
Justice Blackmun explained that indirect evidence that Sony caused, 
induced, or contributed to the direct infringement of the plaintiffs’ 
copyrights was sufficient.52 Still, the dissent recognized the need to 
protect certain technology from the chilling effects of over-broad 
copyright laws.53 Therefore, Justice Blackmun concluded that, 
if a significant portion of the product’s use is noninfringing, the 
manufacturers and sellers cannot be held contributorily liable for 
the product’s infringing uses. If virtually all of the product’s use, 
however, is to infringe, contributory liability may be imposed; if 
no one would buy the product for noninfringing purposes alone, 
it is clear that the manufacturer is purposely profiting from the 
infringement, and that liability is appropriately imposed. In such 
a case . . . the manufacturer of such a product contributes to the 
infringing activities of others and profits directly thereby, while 
providing no benefit to the public sufficient to justify the 
infringement.54 
Below, the Ninth Circuit applied this rule.55 However, the district 
court failed to make factual findings regarding the amount of infringing 
VCR usage.56 Thus, Justice Blackmun, unlike the majority, “would 
remand the case for further consideration.”57 
                                                                                                             
 46 Id. at 444. 
 47 Id. at 456. 
 48 Id. at 457 (Blackmun, J. dissenting). 
 49 Id. at 457-86. 
 50 Id. at 486-90. 
 51 Id. at 487. 
 52 Id. at 489-90. “Sony’s advertisements, at various times, have suggested that 
Betamax users ‘record favorite shows’ or ‘build a library.’”  Id. at 459. 
 53 Id. at 491. 
 54 Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 55 Id. at 492. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 493. 
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The Sony decision is anything but clear. First, a deeply divided 
Court delivered the Sony rule. The majority issued the substantial 
noninfringing uses test58 and the dissent argued for a significant 
noninfringing uses test.59 Then, the majority blurred the line between the 
two tests when it applied the Sony rule and asked whether the VCR had 
significant noninfringing uses.60 Because of this awkward diction, the 
circuit courts have had difficulty interpreting the rule. 
B. The Unresolved Circuit Split: Aimster and Grokster 
As technology advanced, the application of the Sony rule proved 
difficult for the lower courts. In A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., the 
record companies sued the notorious Napster for contributory copyright 
infringement.61 Napster allowed users to share MP3 music files via peer-
to-peer (P2P) software.62 In order to access Napster, however, users had 
to install the Napster software and log into the system with a user name 
and password.63 When it applied the Sony rule, the Ninth Circuit noted 
that “[t]he record support[ed] the . . . finding that Napster ha[d] actual 
knowledge that specific infringing material [wa]s available using its 
system, that it could block access to the system by suppliers of the 
infringing material, and that it failed to remove the material.”64 After 
Napster, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits’ interpretations of the Sony rule 
diverged. The diverging opinions developed into a contentious circuit 
split with each circuit criticizing the other. In 2005, approximately 
twenty years after Sony, the Supreme Court faced the issue once again. 
However, the Court avoided the obvious need to clarify the Sony rule and 
issued a new rule: one who purposefully induces infringement is a 
contributory copyright infringer.65 The Court failed to address the circuit 
split. Subsequent sections of this comment provide a clarification of 
                                                                                                             
 58 Id. at 442 (majority opinion). 
 59 Id. at 491 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 60 Id. at 442 (majority opinion). 
 61 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 62 Id. As the Ninth Circuit explained: 
MPEG-3 [files], abbreviated as “MP3” . . . are created through a process 
colloquially called “ripping.” Ripping software allows a computer owner to 
copy an audio compact disk (“audio CD”) directly onto a computer’s hard 
drive by compressing the audio information on the CD into the MP3 format. 
The MP3’s compressed format allows for rapid transmission of digital audio 
files from one computer to another by electronic mail or any other file 
transfer protocol. 
Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 1022. 
 65 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780. 
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contributory copyright infringement based on the two relevant Supreme 
Court rules. Therefore, this section will address the circuit split, which 
led to the Supreme Court’s holding in Grokster. 
1. Aimster66 
Although the record companies successfully shut down Napster in 
2001, the issue surrounding the Sony interpretation lived on.67 Other P2P 
networks picked up where Napster left off and the record companies 
commenced new litigation. At first glance, Aimster appears to be yet 
another Napster-esque case, where the recording industry sued the 
provider of free music downloading software controlled by a centralized 
computer server.68 However, Aimster’s divergence from Napster created 
the circuit split between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits.69 Judge Posner 
delivered the opinion of the court, which eloquently discussed the Sony 
rule as it applied to the Aimster software.70 In so doing, Judge Posner 
diverged from the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation and qualified the 
protection offered by the Sony rule.71 
In its effort to enjoin Aimster, the Seventh Circuit departed from 
Napster and limited Sony. The court noted that software providers that 
utilize a centralized server maintain a (limited) relationship with their 
                                                                                                             
 66 In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) (addressing the 
district court’s ruling, which imposed a preliminary injunction against Aimster). 
 67 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C 99-0518, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2186 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2001) (enjoining Napster from continuing its operation of copying, 
transmitting, downloading, uploading, or otherwise distributing copyrighted works). 
 68 Aimster, 334 F.3d at 645-46. Judge Posner explains: 
The Aimster system has the following essential components: proprietary 
software that can be downloaded free of charge from Aimster’s Web site; 
Aimster’s server (a server is a computer that provides services to other 
computers, in this case personal computers owned or accessed by Aimster’s 
users, over a network), which hosts the Web site and collects and organizes 
information obtained from the users but does not make copies of the 
swapped files themselves and that also provides the matching service 
described below; computerized tutorials instructing users of the software on 
how to use it for swapping computer files; and “Club Aimster,” a related 
Internet service owned by Deep that users of Aimster’s software can join for 
a fee and use to download the “top 40” popular-music files more easily than 
by using the basic, free service. The “AIM” in “Aimster” stands for AOL 
instant-messaging service. 
Id. at 646. 
 69 Id. at 649 (citing 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 6.1.2, p. 6:12-1 (2d ed. 2003)). 
(“We . . . agree with Professor Goldstein that the Ninth Circuit erred in A&M Records, 
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001), in suggesting that actual 
knowledge of specific infringing uses is a sufficient condition for deeming a facilitator a 
contributory infringer.”). 
 70 Id. at 647-51. 
 71 Id. at 648-53. 
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users, unlike Sony.72 Judge Posner reasoned that the continued 
relationship and the ability to police the habits of users should be a factor 
in determining contributory liability.73 Similarly, the court held that 
“[w]illful blindness is knowledge”; thus, Aimster’s effort to avoid actual 
knowledge (the nail in Napster’s coffin) did not save it from liability.74 In 
addition, the court sought to simplify the Sony rule by analogizing 
contributory infringement to the criminal concept of aiding and 
abetting.75 Judge Posner explained, “To the recording industry, a single 
known infringing use brands the facilitator as a contributory infringer. To 
the Aimsters of this world, a single noninfringing use provides complete 
immunity from liability. Neither is correct.”76 In Judge Posner’s view, 
“[i]t is not enough . . . that a product or service be physically capable . . . 
of [a] noninfringing use,”77 there must be evidence that the product or 
service is “actually used for . . . the stated non-infringing purposes.”78 
Aimster failed to provide any evidence of noninfringing uses. Because 
Aimster could not satisfy the Seventh Circuit’s qualified Sony rule, the 
court upheld the preliminary injunction.79 
                                                                                                             
 72 Id. at 648 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
438 (1984)) (“[T]he video recorder was being used for a mixture of infringing and 
noninfringing uses and . . . . Sony could not demix them because once Sony sold the 
recorder it lost all control over its use.”). 
 73 Id. at 648. 
 74 Id. at 650. Aimster used an encryption device to shield it from actual knowledge of 
infringement. Id. 
 75 Id. at 651. Judge Posner noted: 
There are analogies in the law of aiding and abetting, the criminal 
counterpart to contributory infringement. A retailer of slinky dresses is not 
guilty of aiding and abetting prostitution even if he knows that some of his 
customers are prostitutes—he may even know which ones are. The extent to 
which his activities and those of similar sellers actually promote prostitution 
is likely to be slight relative to the social costs of imposing a risk of 
prosecution on him. But the owner of a massage parlor who employs 
women who are capable of giving massages, but in fact as he knows sell 
only sex and never massages to their customers, is an aider and abettor of 
prostitution (as well as being guilty of pimping or operating a brothel). The 
slinky-dress case corresponds to Sony, and, like Sony, is not inconsistent 
with imposing liability on the seller of a product or service that, as in the 
massage-parlor case, is capable of noninfringing uses but in fact is used only 
to infringe. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 653. 
 78 Id. Judge Posner’s opinion is reminiscent of Judge Blackmun’s opinion in Sony. 
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 491 (1984) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). However, the Sony court consistently used the words “capable 
of.”  Id. at 442 (majority opinion). 
 79 Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653-56. 
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Judge Posner’s opinion created a divergence between the Seventh 
and Ninth Circuits.80 Each court sought to interpret the difficult Sony 
language.81 Judge Posner quoted the Sony majority’s contradictory 
language,82 but held in line with the Sony dissent.83 Shortly after Aimster, 
the Ninth Circuit faced another contributory copyright infringement case 
involving P2P software.84 In Grokster, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its 
previous position contra the Seventh Circuit.85 Ultimately, Grokster, 
which was appealed to the Supreme Court, deepened the split between 
the circuits and provided no clarification of the Sony rule. 
2. Grokster: Ninth Circuit to the Supreme Court86 
This section discusses the most recent case concerning contributory 
copyright infringement. Grokster is significant because it represents the 
continuing circuit split as well as the new rule in contributory copyright 
law. The Ninth Circuit, remaining true to precedent, decided not to join 
the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of Sony.87 Plaintiffs appealed the 
matter to the Supreme Court, which they asked to clarify the Sony rule.88 
The Court, however, refused to revisit the Sony rule and failed to address 
the circuit split.89 Instead, the Court issued a new inducement rule that 
imposes liability on those who purposefully encourage infringement.90 
Although the Court unanimously agreed with the application of the 
inducement rule, the concurrences differed in their interpretation of the 
Sony rule.91 Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion gives a particularly 
insightful discussion of the Sony rule.92 Thus, any discussion of 
contributory copyright infringement requires an understanding of the 
Grokster decision. 
In an attempt to avoid the pitfalls of Napster and Aimster, Grokster 
and StreamCast (defendants) distributed free software that enabled users 
to share files by way of P2P networks.93 “A user who downloads and 
                                                                                                             
 80 Id. at 649 (citing 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 6.1.2, p. 6:12-1 (2d ed. 2003)). 
 81 Id. at 648; A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
 82 Aimster, 334 F.3d at 648. 
 83 Id. at 353. 
 84 Grokster I, 380 F.3d at 1162 n.9. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2764. 
 87 Grokster I, 380 F.3d at 1162 n.9. 
 88 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2778. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 2780. 
 91 Id. at 2787 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 2770 (majority opinion). 
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installs either [defendant’s] software possesses the protocol to send 
requests for files directly to the computers of others using [compatible] 
software . . .”94 P2P networks are more secure, less costly, and more 
efficient than other networks, because they operate without a central 
server.95 These benefits have not gone unnoticed; in addition to the 
defendants’ patrons, universities, governmental agencies, corporations, 
and libraries utilize such networks.96 Although P2P networks are cost-
effective, the lack of a central server makes it difficult to monitor the 
shared information and intercept the potentially illegal behavior of 
users.97 As a result, the defendants’ users allegedly employed the P2P 
networks for the unauthorized sharing of copyrighted music and video 
files.98 
A group of copyright holders (plaintiffs) sued the defendants for 
contributory copyright infringement.99 The district court found that 
software users who downloaded protected files directly infringed the 
plaintiffs’ copyrights.100 Nevertheless, the court granted the defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment as to liability for contributory 
infringement.101 The district court held that the distribution of the P2P 
software “did not provide the distributors with actual knowledge of 
specific acts of infringement.”102 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed.103 It read Sony “as holding that distribution of a commercial 
product capable of substantial noninfringing uses could not give rise to 
contributory liability for infringement unless the distributor had actual 
                                                                                                             
 94 Id. at 2771. 
 95 Id. at 2770. Unlike Grokster, Napster and Aimster did not operate with true P2P 
software; both companies operated with a central server. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 
334 F.3d 643, 648 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 
1011 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 96 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2770. 
 97 Id. at 2770 n.1. 
 98 Id. at 2770-71. 
 99 Id. at 2771. Despite the lack of an omniscient central server, the plaintiffs provided 
impressive evidence, which showed that copyrighted material accounted for 
approximately 90% of the files available on the defendants’ P2P networks. Id. at 2772. 
The defendants, relying heavily on Sony, argued that P2P networks have substantial 
noninfringing uses, including, but not limited to, the free distribution of musical works to 
wider audiences as well as the free file sharing of unprotected works, like Shakespeare 
and Supreme Court Case Briefs. Id. Furthermore, some copyright holders, such as Wilco, 
authorized the file sharing of their work. Id. at 2784 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Id. at 
2772 (majority opinion). The defendants’ revenue did not come from users of the free 
software, but rather from the sale of advertisements streamed to users employing the 
software: infringement was not their business. Id. at 2774. 
 100 Id. at 2774. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 2774. 
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knowledge of specific instances of infringement and failed to act on that 
knowledge.”104 The Ninth Circuit’s ruling differed dramatically from 
Judge Posner’s Seventh Circuit opinion105 and, thus, deepened the split 
between the circuits.106 The Supreme Court certified the question: “under 
what circumstances [is] the distributor of a product capable of both 
lawful and unlawful use . . . liable for acts of copyright infringement by 
third parties using the product.”107 
Justice Souter’s majority opinion began with a reaffirmation of the 
Court’s duty to balance the interests of copyright owners against the 
public’s interest in technological innovation.108 The Court then explained 
that Sony “absolves the . . . conduct of selling an item with substantial 
lawful as well as unlawful uses, and limits liability to instances of more 
acute fault than the mere understanding that some of one’s products will 
be misused.”109 Despite the plaintiffs’ argument that a clear definition of 
the term “substantial” was the key to the case, the Supreme Court 
sidestepped the entire issue.110 “[T]he Court of Appeals misapplied 
Sony,” the majority explained, because “[the] Ninth Circuit . . . read 
Sony’s limitation to mean that whenever a product is capable of 
substantial lawful use, the producer can never be held contributorily 
liable for third parties’ infringing use of it.”111 Justice Souter opined, “[i]t 
is enough to note that the Ninth Circuit’s judgment rested on an 
erroneous understanding of Sony and to leave further consideration of the 
                                                                                                             
 104 Id. at 2774-75. 
 105 The Ninth Circuit addressed this divergence directly: “[w]e are mindful that the 
Seventh Circuit has read Sony’s substantial noninfringing use standard differently . . . . 
Even if we were free to do so, we do not read [Sony]’s holding as narrowly as does the 
Seventh Circuit.”  Grokster I, 380 F.3d at 1162 n.9. 
 106 The circuits diverged regarding two aspects of contributory infringement as 
outlined by Sony: knowledge and noninfringing uses. In Aimster, Judge Posner disagreed 
with the Ninth Circuit’s rule that actual knowledge of specific acts of infringement was 
necessary for liability. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(citing 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 6.1.2, p. 6:12-1 (2d ed. 2003)). Instead, the court 
held that constructive knowledge was adequate to establish liability. Id. at 650. The 
Seventh Circuit also held that “[i]t is not enough . . . that a product or service be 
physically capable . . . of noninfringing use,” there must be evidence that the product or 
service is “actually used for . . . the stated non-infringing purposes.”  Id. at 653. In 
contrast, the Ninth Circuit held that the Sony rule absolved distributors of liability 
whenever their product or service was capable of substantial noninfringing use. Grokster, 
125 S. Ct. at 2778. 
 107 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2770. 
 108 Id. at 2775. 
 109 Id. at 2777-78. 
 110 Id. at 2778; see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 
417, 457 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The Court has tended to evade the hard 
issues when they arise in the area of copyright law.”). 
 111 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2778. The Supreme Court did not expressly uphold the 
Seventh Circuit’s standard nor did it note the circuit split. 
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Sony rule for a day when that may be required.”112 The majority then 
focused on the inducement claim and “[did] not revisit Sony further.”113 
Once again, the Supreme Court looked to patent law for guidance 
on a copyright case.114 The majority held that “one who distributes a 
device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as 
shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster 
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third 
parties.”115 
[M]ere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing 
uses would not be enough here to subject a distributor to liability. 
Nor would ordinary acts incident to product distribution, such as 
offering customers technical support or product updates, support 
liability in themselves. The inducement rule, instead, premises 
liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and 
thus does nothing to compromise legitimate commerce or 
discourage innovation having a lawful promise.116 
Applying this inducement rule to the facts presented, the majority 
held that “summary judgment in favor of [the defendants] was error.”117 
The Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the matter 
for further proceedings.118 
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Kennedy, imparted the concurring opinion that summary judgment was 
inappropriate based on the software distribution as well as the active 
inducement of infringement.119 Justice Ginsburg explained that 
distributors may be liable as contributory infringers if their product lacks 
“‘substantial’ or ‘commercially significant’ noninfringing uses.”120 
However, “there was no need in Sony to ‘give precise content to the 
question of how much [actual or potential] use is commercially 
significant.’”121 In Sony, Justice Ginsburg argued, the evidence of 
                                                                                                             
 112 Id. at 2778-79. Thus, the circuit split has not been resolved. Not only did the 
Supreme Court fail to clarify the Sony rule, but it also failed to adopt the Seventh 
Circuit’s position. Id. at 2778-80. Justice Souter’s opinion notes the Ninth Circuit’s 
position on actual knowledge, but does not directly address it. Id. at 2774-75. Instead, the 
Court simply stated that the Ninth Circuit misapplied Sony. Id. at 2778-79. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 2779. 
 115 Id. at 2780. 
 116 Id. (emphasis added). 
 117 Id. at 2782. 
 118 Id. at 2783. 
 119 Id. at 2783 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 120 Id. (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 
(1984)). 
 121 Id. at 2784 (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 442). 
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noninfringing uses was far greater than that presented in this case.122 The 
Ninth Circuit erred because it relied heavily on declarations of 
substantial noninfringing uses supplied by the defendants.123 Thus, 
Justice Ginsburg concurred with the majority, finding summary 
judgment inappropriate.124 
In response to Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence, Justice Breyer, with 
whom Justices Stevens and O’Connor joined, penned a separate 
concurring opinion.125 Specifically, Justice Breyer disagreed with Justice 
Ginsburg’s opinion that summary judgment was inappropriate based on 
the P2P network’s capability of substantial noninfringing use.126 Though 
Justice Breyer agreed with Justice Ginsburg’s discussion of the Sony 
rule, “the record evidence . . . convince[d] [him] that the Court of 
Appeals’ conclusion ha[d] adequate legal support.”127 
Justice Breyer noted that “[t]he [Sony] Court found that the 
magnitude of authorized programming [a mere 9% of all television 
programming] was ‘significant.’”128 Furthermore, Justice Breyer 
explained, the Sony Court “also noted the ‘significant potential for future 
authorized copying.’”129 “The [Sony] Court, in using the key word 
‘substantial,’ indicated that [the authorized programming] constituted a 
sufficient basis for rejecting the imposition of secondary liability.”130 
With that in mind, Justice Breyer compared the facts in Sony to those 
presented in Grokster.131 The number of files authorized for 
                                                                                                             
 122 Id. at 2785. The plaintiffs provided impressive evidence, which showed that 
copyrighted material accounted for approximately 90% of the files available on the 
defendants’ P2P networks. Id. at 2772 (majority opinion). The defendants disputed the 
means of determining this finding as well as the implication. Id. To their detriment, the 
defendants “concede[d] [to] infringement in most downloads.” Id. The defendants e-
mailed directions, which outlined acts of direct infringement, to users. Id. The defendants 
also seemed to encourage infringement though their advertising campaigns, which 
targeted former Napster users with a penchant for copyright infringement. Id. at 2773. 
The defendants made no effort to filter copyrighted material from users’ downloads, but 
“aimed to have a larger number of copyrighted songs [such at Top 40 tracks] available on 
their networks than other file-sharing networks.”  Id. They sent e-mails to warn users 
about copyright infringement, but never blocked anyone presumed to make illegal use of 
their software. Id. at 2774. 
 123 Id. at 2785 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 124 Id. at 2785-86. 
 125 Id. 2787-96 (Breyer, J., concurring). Notably, Justice Stevens, who authored the 
Sony opinion, joined Justice Breyer’s opinion. 
 126 Id. at 2787. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. at 2788 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 
417, 444 (1984)). 
 129 Id. (emphasis added). 
 130 Id. at 2788. 
 131 Id. 
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downloading, according to the plaintiffs’ expert, was 10%, a figure 
remarkably similar to the amount of authorized programming in Sony.132 
Thus, Justice Breyer opined, “it is reasonable to infer quantities of 
current lawful use roughly approximate to those at issue in Sony.”133 
In addition, Justice Breyer explained, “[Sony’s] . . . language . . . 
suggest[s] that a figure like 10%, if fixed for all time, might well prove 
insufficient, but that such a figure serves as an adequate foundation 
where there is a reasonable prospect of expanded legitimate uses over 
time.”134 Justice Breyer then provided a lengthy discussion of the P2P 
software’s future noninfringing uses.135 “As more and more 
uncopyrighted information is stored in swappable form, it seems a likely 
inference that lawful [P2P] sharing will become increasingly 
prevalent.”136 Justice Breyer included a laundry list of up-and-coming 
legitimate noninfringing uses for P2P software,137 but noted “[t]here may 
be other now-unforeseen noninfringing uses that develop for [P2P] 
software, just as the home-video rental industry (unmentioned in Sony) 
developed for the VCR.”138 Granted, “[the defendants] may not want to 
                                                                                                             
 132 Id. at 2788-89. The defendants submitted evidence of free electronic books (from 
project Gutenberg); authorized music downloads (from artists like Wilco, Pearl Jam, 
Dave Matthews, and John Mayer); authorized clips from music videos as well as software 
in the public domain in order to establish its current noninfringing uses. Id.  Sony 
proffered evidence from professional sports league officials, religious broadcasting 
representatives, and Mr. Rogers to establish its current noninfringing uses. Sony, 464 U.S. 
at 445-46. 
 133 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2789 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 134 Id. (citation omitted). 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 2789-90. 
 137 Justice Breyer expounded: 
[L]egitimate noninfringing uses are coming to include the swapping of: 
research information (the initial purpose of many peer-to-peer networks); 
public domain films (e.g., those owned by the Prelinger Archive); historical 
recordings and digital educational materials (e.g., those stored on the 
Internet Archive); digital photos (OurPictures, for example, is starting a P2P 
photo-swapping service); “shareware” and “freeware” (e.g., Linux and 
certain Windows software); secure licensed music and movie files (Intent 
MediaWorks, for example, protects licensed content sent across P2P 
networks); news broadcasts past and present (the BBC Creative Archive 
lets users “rip, mix and share the BBC”); user-created audio and video files 
(including “podcasts” that may be distributed through P2P software); and all 
manner of free “open content” works collected by Creative Commons (one 
can search for Creative Commons material on StreamCast). [Citation 
omitted.]  I can find nothing in the record that suggests that this course of 
events will not continue to flow naturally as a consequence of the character 
of the software taken together with the foreseeable development of the 
Internet and of information technology. 
Id. at 2790. 
 138 Id. 
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develop these other noninfringing uses. But Sony’s standard seeks to 
protect not the Groksters of this world . . ., but the development of 
technology more generally.”139 
Grokster is important, because the Court refused to revisit the Sony 
rule.140 Instead, the Court established the inducement rule, which, unlike 
the Sony rule, penalizes purposeful conduct resulting in infringement.141 
Although the Court unanimously applied the inducement rule to the 
defendants, the concurrences differed in their interpretation of the Sony 
rule.142 Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Stevens, the author of the Sony 
rule, wrote a concurring opinion that carefully discussed the Sony rule 
and provided explanation regarding the rule.143 Justice Breyer’s 
discussion of the social benefits of P2P software is particularly important 
to this comment. 
II. COPYRIGHTS, TECHNOLOGY AND TORTS 
This section develops copyright law’s dual objectives as well as its 
origins in the Constitution. This section also establishes the links 
between contributory copyright infringement and tort law. The theory of 
contributory copyright liability “originates in tort law and stems from the 
notion that one who directly contributes to another’s infringement should 
be held accountable.”144 However, when a product or service is capable 
of lawful and illegal uses, the “Sony[] rule limits imputing culpable 
intent” to contribute to copyright infringement based on product 
distribution.145 Just as the Sony Court was divided, the circuits split 
regarding the application of the Sony rule.146 Recently, the Supreme 
Court refused to provide guidance for the lower courts,147 and the 
concurrences reveal a still divided Court.148 Thus, when another case 
requires clarification of the Sony rule, the lower courts should look to tort 
law for an explanation. 
The United States Constitution explicitly grants Congress the 
power: “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
                                                                                                             
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. at 2778 (majority opinion). 
 141 Id. at 2780. 
 142 Id. at 2787 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 143 Id. 
 144 Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 145 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2779. 
 146 In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 147 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2779. 
 148 Id. at 2787 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”149 Copyright serves both 
the private interests of the authors as well as the public interests of 
American society. Although the monopoly granted by the Constitution to 
authors provides a special reward, the goal is to enable others access to 
this protected expression for inspiration in creating their own expression 
and, thereby, promote knowledge.150 Because of these dual objectives, 
“copyright protection has enjoyed a revered place in our national legal 
system and in the development of the arts, sciences, the economy, and 
industrialization of our nation.”151 The still-nascent Congress first 
enacted copyright legislation in 1790.152 However, copyright law is not 
an American invention; rather it is a constantly evolving descendent of 
the British censorship laws.153 From the time of Guttenberg’s printing 
press up to today, copyright law has developed hand in hand with the 
advance of technology.154 
Copyright law’s dual objectives require review whenever 
technological innovation leaves the Copyright Act behind.155 The Sony 
court aptly described this process as striking a “difficult balance between 
the interests of authors . . . and society’s competing interest.”156 Although 
Congress is the body empowered by the Constitution to enact copyright 
legislation, the Supreme Court, through its power of interpretation, has 
made the most recent adjustments to copyright law in the Grokster 
opinion. The Court has been left with the task of striking the “difficult 
                                                                                                             
 149 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 150 CCC Information Services, Inc. v. MacLean Hunter Market Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 
61, 68 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1953)) (“‘The economic 
philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the 
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to 
advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in Science and useful 
Arts.’”); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 443 
(1984)). 
 151 Dun & Bradstreet Software Serv., Inc. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 
206 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 152 Id. 
 153 Sony, 464 U.S. at 430 n.12 (citing Foreword to B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW 
OF COPYRIGHT vii-viii (1967)) (“‘Copyright protection became necessary with the 
invention of the printing press and had its early beginnings in the British censorship 
laws.’”); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd, 
125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-480) (Justice Breyer noted, “[F]or all I know, the monks 
had a fit when Gutenberg made his press.”). 
 154 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 430 n.12 (citing Foreword to B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED 
VIEW OF COPYRIGHT vii-viii (1967)). 
 155 Id. at 432 (citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 
(1975)). 
 156 Id. at 429; see also Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2775 (“The more artistic protection is 
favored, the more technological innovation may be discouraged; the administration of 
copyright law is an exercise in managing the trade off.”). 
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balance,” because those seeking swift relief and enforcement of their 
rights often commence copyright infringement actions before Congress 
can respond157 or as an alternative to congressional action.158 
An owner of a valid copyright may sue a direct infringer for 
copyright infringement if that infringer has copied elements of the 
copyright holder’s work without permission.159 Direct infringers are 
those persons who actually copied the original elements of a copyright 
holder’s work without permission.160 It seems simple, but modern 
technology continues to complicate matters. Today, Americans have 
VCRs, DVRs, DVD burners, CD burners, and P2P networks at their 
disposal. Thus, millions of unauthorized people can access and reproduce 
copyrighted material with the greatest of ease; “it may be impossible to 
enforce rights in the protected work effectively against all direct 
infringers, the only practical alternative being to go against the 
distributor of the copying device for secondary liability on a theory of 
contributory . . . infringement.”161 
Despite the Supreme Court’s use of this theory, Congress did not 
include contributory liability in the language of the Copyright Act.162 
Instead, the Sony Court looked to patent law, which finds its beginnings 
in the same constitutional clause as copyright law, to establish the theory. 
Contributory infringement, however, is not a creation of patent law, but 
tort law.163 “Contributory infringement originates in tort law and stems 
                                                                                                             
 157 Sony, 464 U.S. at 429. 
 158 The inducement standard adopted in Grokster as well as the Court’s refusal to 
revisit Sony may have been the Court’s effort to “split the baby” in light of the defeat of 
the Inducing Infringements of Copyright Act, S. 2560, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (2004). See 
Christine Pope, iBrief, Unfinished Business: Are Today’s P2P Networks Liable for 
Copyright Infringement?, 22 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. ¶33 (2005), 
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/PDF/2005DLTR0022.pdf. 
 159 Dun & Bradstreet Software Serv., Inc. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 
206 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1231 (3d 
Cir. 1986); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 831 (10th Cir.1993)) 
(“To establish a claim of copyright infringement [against a direct infringer], a plaintiff 
must establish: (1) ownership of a valid copyright; and (2) unauthorized copying of 
original elements of the plaintiff’s work.”). 
 160 Sony, 464 U.S. at 433 (citing 17 U.S. C. § 501(a)) (“[A]nyone who trespasses into 
[the copyright holder’s] exclusive domain by using . . . the copyrighted work . . . ‘is an 
infringer of the copyright.’”); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 
2003) (“[People] like to swap computer files containing popular music. If the music is 
copyrighted, such swapping, which involves making and transmitting a digital copy of 
the music, infringes copyright. The swappers . . . are the direct infringers.”). 
 161 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2776. 
 162 Id. (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 434). 
 163 See Fonovisa, Inc v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996); see 
also In re Magnavox Co., 627 F.2d 803, 805 (7th Cir. 1980) (“[P]atent infringement is 
generally considered to be a tort.”). 
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from the notion that one who directly contributes to another’s 
infringement should be held accountable.”164 Accordingly, ‘“one who, 
with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially 
contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 
‘contributory’ infringer.”165 
As evinced by Sony, plaintiffs may reasonably believe that the 
marketing and distribution of a product with some infringing uses are 
means of contributing to direct infringement. The Supreme Court 
disagreed and, as the Court elucidates in Grokster, the “Sony[] rule limits 
imputing culpable intent”166 to contributorily infringe based on product 
distribution, if a product (such as the VCR or P2P software) has 
substantial noninfringing uses.167 Since its pronouncement, the Sony rule 
has caused some difficulty. Though the Court reversed the Ninth 
Circuit’s holding, the Grokster Court refused to further clarify the Sony 
rule or even address the circuit split between the Seventh and Ninth 
Circuits.168 Instead, the Court introduced a new rule and left the lingering 
questions surrounding substantiality of noninfringing uses for another 
day.169 The lower courts must now distill the murky waters: what is the 
meaning of “substantial?” The tort law definition of intent provides some 
much needed clarity. 
III. SONY, SUBSTANTIAL CERTAINTY AND THE BALANCE 
This section uses tort law to clarify the Sony rule. First, this section 
provides a detailed discussion of the Restatement’s definition of intent. 
Just as the Restatement bifurcates intent in tort law,170 Sony and Grokster 
provide two situations in which a defendant may possess the intent to 
contribute to direct infringement.171 The comments accompanying the 
Restatement’s definition limit its scope.172 In certain situations, 
                                                                                                             
 164 Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264 (emphasis added). 
 165 Id. 
 166 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2779 (emphasis added). 
 167 See Christopher Norgaard, The Supreme Court Shares its Intent: Grokster’s 
Misplaced Pronouncements on Secondary Liability for Copyright Infringement, 70 PAT., 
TRADEMARK, & COPYRIGHT J. 545 (2005) (“A product’s capability of noninfringing use . . 
. is relevant only when there is no direct evidence of inducement or encouragement. In 
other words, when a product’s only realistic and reasonable use is for infringement . . . 
the . . . distribution of the product induces and encourages the infringement.”). 
 168 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2778-79. 
 169 Id. at 2780. 
 170 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001). 
 171 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984). 
 172 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e 
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illustrated by the examples listed in the comments,173 a defendant “may 
be engaging in a generally proper activity for generally proper reasons, 
even though the activity produces harm as an unavoidable but unwanted 
byproduct.”174 In such instances, the Restatement limits those 
defendants’ liability unless their conduct will affect a particular victim or 
a small class of victims in a localized area.175 This limitation focuses 
liability on those who evince a blameworthy intent.176 In addition, the 
substantial certainty limitation creates a balancing test akin to tort law’s 
negligence standard.177 Thus, the Restatement suggests that, if a 
defendant’s conduct provides a net social benefit despite a substantial 
certainty of some harmful consequences, liability should be limited.178 
This limitation, when applied to contributory copyright infringement, 
will balance the interests of copyright holders and society. 
A. The Restatement on Intent 
Section one of the Restatement (Third) of Torts179 explains that “[a] 
person acts with the intent to produce a consequence if: (a) The person 
has the purpose of producing that consequence; or (b) The person knows 
to a substantial certainty that the consequence will ensue from the 
person’s conduct.”180 Although this is not a new concept, the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts clearly bifurcates the intent requirement for 
intentional torts.181 Similarly, the Supreme Court decisions in both Sony 
and Grokster provide two situations in which a manufacturer/software 
provider may possess the culpable intent for contributory 
infringement.182 Grokster imposes liability on those who induce 
                                                                                                             
 173 Id. 
 174 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. a. 
 175 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e. 
 176 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e, reporter’s notes. 
 177 See id. 
 178 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e. 
 179 The Restatement is a publication of the American Law Institute (ALI), which is an 
organization comprised of prominent members of the legal profession. ARTHUR BEST & 
DAVID W. BARNES, BASIC TORT LAW: CASES, STATUTES, AND PROBLEMS 18 (Aspen 
Publishers 2003). It is not binding law, but a model designed to standardize state laws 
across the country. Id. Though the Restatement (Third) of Torts is still a draft, it carries 
the weight of the ALI’s prestige; thus, it is highly persuasive. Id. 
 180 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 (emphasis added). 
 181 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965) (defining a similar, yet 
blended, definition of intent that focuses on two mind states). 
 182 The Supreme Court is not the only body to adopt a seemingly bifurcated definition 
of intent in the copyright context. In 1998, Congress passed the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA), which provides a variety of additional protections for certain 
copyright holders, who utilize protective technological devices. As outlined by the 
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infringement or distribute their product for the purpose of promoting 
infringement.183 The language of the rule calls to mind the Restatement’s 
first intent prong: purpose/desire. On the other hand, the distribution of a 
product, if a company knows to a substantial certainty that infringement 
will ensue from that distribution, results in contributory liability.184 This 
section will show that Sony, despite its rather cumbersome language, 
represents the second intent prong.185 
In addition to defining intent, the Restatement makes many careful 
qualifications concerning that definition. The drafters specifically note 
the obvious differences between desire and substantial certainty.186 The 
drafters also argue that actions taken with the purpose to produce a 
harmful consequence evince a culpable desire state.187 However, 
substantial certainty is a grey area. Just because one has substantial 
                                                                                                             
additional violations under DMCA, Congress also employs a two-pronged intent 
standard: 
(1) No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or 
otherwise traffic in technology, product, service, device, component, or part 
thereof, that 
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of 
circumventing [encryption and protective devices used by the 
copyright holders to protect their work]; 
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use 
other than to circumvent [encryption and protective devices 
used by the copyright holders to protect their work] . . . . 
17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2000 & Supp. 2005). The language of subsection A 
implicates those with a guilty mind and the language of sub-section B is remarkably 
similar to the Sony rule and its focus on “substantial noninfringing uses.”  
 183 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780. 
 184 The Court specifically states, “Sony’s rule limits imputing culpable intent,” which 
calls to mind the language of the Restatement’s discussion of intent. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 
at 2779; see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 
(1984) (“[T]he sale of copying equipment . . . does not constitute contributory 
infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. 
Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”); see also Norgaard, 
supra note 167. With regard to the circuit split, the Restatement only requires 
“knowledge.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001).  Given 
Sony’s silence on the issue and the Grokster ruling against the Ninth Circuit, it may be 
safe to say that constructive knowledge is adequate. 
 185 The Court’s language seems to incorporate both the substantial certainty theory as 
well as its limitation in one rule, which makes it difficult to decipher without the aid of 
the Restatement. This difficulty may have led to the circuit split as well as the Court’s 
reluctance to revisit the rule. 
 186 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. a. (“There are obvious differences 
between the actor who acts with the desire to cause harm and the actor who engages in 
conduct knowing that harm is substantially certain to happen. There is a clear element of 
wrongfulness in conduct whose very purpose is to cause harm . . . .”). 
 187 Id. (“When an actor chooses to engage in conduct with knowledge that harm is 
certain to follow, this choice, with its known consequence, provides a distinctive 
argument in favor of liability.”). 
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certainty that his actions will produce a harmful consequence does not 
necessarily mean that he has the culpable desire to produce those 
results.188 In fact, despite his substantial certainty, “the actor . . . may be 
engaging in a generally proper activity for generally proper reasons, 
even though the activity produces harm as an unavoidable but unwanted 
byproduct.”189 Such a proper activity may be the operation of a 
railroad190 or the construction of a high rise building.191 Thus, the drafters 
limit the application of the substantial certainty standard when the 
victims are not contained in a small class or within a localized area or 
when the period between cause and effect becomes too great.192 
                                                                                                             
 188 Id. (“[T]here are complications in considering the liability implications of harms 
that are intentional only in the sense that the actor who engages in conduct knows that 
harm is substantially certain to result.”). 
 189 Id. (emphasis added); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. c (“[A] 
mere showing that harm is substantially certain to result from the actor’s conduct is not 
sufficient to prove intent; it must also be shown that the actor is aware of this.”). 
 190 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e, reporter’s notes (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 292, cmt a (1965)) (“[D]espite the inevitability of 
serious injuries caused by railroads, a railroad company is not negligent for merely 
running the railroad.”). 
 191 Section One comment e states: 
[I]n many situations a defendant’s knowledge of substantially certain harms 
is entirely consistent with the absence of any liability in tort. For example, 
an owner of land, arranging for the construction of a high-rise building, can 
confidently predict that some number of workers will be seriously injured  
in the course of the construction project; the company that runs a railroad 
can be sure that railroad operations will over time result in a significant 
number of serious personal injuries; the manufacturer of knives can easily 
predict that a certain number of person’s using its knives will inadvertently 
cut themselves. Despite their knowledge, these actors do not intentionally 
cause the injuries that result. Moreover, despite their knowledge, none of the 
companies – absent further facts – can ever be found guilty of negligence . . 
. .  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e. 
 192 In addition, 
The application[] of the substantial certainty test should be limited to 
situations in which the defendant has knowledge to a substantial certainty 
that the conduct will bring about harm to a particular victim, or to someone 
within a small class of potential victims within a localized area. The test 
loses its persuasiveness when the identity of potential victims becomes 
vaguer, and when in a related way the time frame involving the actor’s 
conduct expands and the causal sequence connecting conduct and harm 
becomes more complex . . . . 
Id. 
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B. The Substantial Certainty Limitation 
The substantial certainty limitation creates a balancing test for the 
protection and promotion of industries serving the public good.193 
Although the Restatement does not expressly state it as such, the 
industrial examples support this theory.194 Furthermore, the substantial 
certainty limitation seems inspired, at least in part, by the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts’ discussion of negligence.195 For example, the 
Restatement explains that “[t]he operation of railways and other public 
utilities, no matter how carefully carried on, produces accidents which . . 
. harm many people but the risk involved in the operation is more than 
counterbalanced by the service which they render the public.”196 Thus, 
the Restatement weighs the harm substantially certain to occur against 
the public benefits derived from that industry’s operation. 
Even prior to the Restatement, the courts considered such a 
limitation on liability to be sound public policy. For instance, in Beatty v. 
Central Iowa Railroad, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed a lower court 
decision that absolved the railroad of guilt for the wrongful death of the 
plaintiff, whose horse spooked along a highway parallel to the railroad 
tracks.197 The court found that the construction of railroad tracks near a 
major roadway was not an act of negligence, because the public interest 
in the progress of technology and the promotion of intercommunication 
outweighed the other factors in favor of liability.198 Similarly, the 
Supreme Court of Nebraska provided a lengthy policy discussion in a 
turntable (attractive nuisance) case.199 The Nebraska Supreme Court 
opined: 
The business of life is better carried forward by the use of 
dangerous machinery; hence the public good demands its use, 
although occasionally such use results in the loss of life or limb. 
It does so because the danger is insignificant, when weighed 
against the benefits resulting from the use of such machinery, and 
                                                                                                             
 193 The Restatement limits liability for certain industries “because it is believed that 
the whole community benefits by it.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 292, cmt. a 
(1965). 
 194 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e. 
 195 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e, reporter’s notes. 
 196 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 292, cmt. a (1965). 
 197 12 N.W. 332 (Iowa 1882). 
 198 Id. at 334 (“Railways, if constructed at all, must of necessity, cross over highways. 
. . . All persons must accept the advantages of this mode of intercommunication with the 
danger and inconveniences which necessarily attend it; the price of progress cannot be 
withheld.”). 
 199 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Krayenbuhl, 91 N.W. 880, 882 (Neb. 1902) 
(“‘[T]he business of life must go forward;’ the means by which it is carried forward 
cannot be rendered absolutely safe.”). 
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for the same reason demands its reasonable, most effective and 
unrestricted use, up to the point where the benefits resulting from 
such use no longer outweigh the danger to be anticipated from it. 
At that point the public good demands restrictions.200 
Both of these courts balance the costs and benefits of operating a 
railroad in order to determine negligence: the cost of operating a railroad 
is outweighed by the social benefits derived from that industry. The ALR 
found this analysis persuasive when drafting the Restatement (Third) 
and, consequently, adopted it as the substantial certainty limitation. Thus, 
when a defendant’s (an industry or software provider) conduct provides a 
net social benefit despite a substantial certainty of some harmful 
consequences, the courts should limit the defendant’s liability. 
Another justification for the substantial certainty limitation is the 
argument that “[d]esire-states . . . usually express culpability much more 
directly than belief-states do . . . . [W]hen belief is blameworthy, it is 
usually because the belief is strong evidence of some blameworthy 
desire-state.”201 For example, companies do not desire their railroads to 
cause serious bodily injury; they operate for the profitable purpose of 
transporting people and goods. Serious injury does not advance those 
goals. In addition, a subconscious desire to cause personal injury does 
not form the foundation of that certainty, rather the company’s 
pragmatism results in a general understanding that personal injury is 
likely to result from the operation of a railroad.202 On the other hand, 
assume an entity engages in conduct it knows to a substantial certainty 
will cause the serious injury or death of an employee, “a particular 
victim, or . . . someone within a small class of potential victims within a 
localized area.”203 That company/person is liable, because their 
                                                                                                             
 200 Id. at 882-83. 
 201 Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463, 496 (1992); 
see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001) (“There are 
obvious differences between the actor who acts with the desire to cause harm and the 
actor who engages in conduct knowing that harm is substantially certain to happen. There 
is a clear element of wrongfulness in conduct whose very purpose is to cause harm . . . ”). 
 202 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 292, cmt. a (1965); See generally Shaw v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 973 F. Supp. 539, 548 (D. Md. 1997) (“While [a 
tobacco company] may have had knowledge that second-hand smoke would reach some 
non-smokers, the Court finds that such generalized knowledge is insufficient to satisfy 
the intent requirement for battery.”); see also Pechan v. DynaPro, Inc., 622 N.E.2d 108, 
117-18 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (“[T]he act of smoking is not performed generally with the 
intent to ‘touch’ nonsmokers with second-hand smoke.”). 
 203 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e; see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 446 (1984) (“[I]n an action for contributory 
infringement against the seller of copying equipment, the copyright holder may not 
prevail unless the relief that he seeks affects only his programs, or unless he speaks for 
virtually all copyright holders with an interest in the outcome.”) (emphasis added). 
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knowledge is not general but reveals a more blameworthy mental state.204 
Thus, the substantial certainty limitation ensures that only those 
people/entities that demonstrate a clear intent (established by their 
purpose or knowledge) will face liability. 
C. Substantial Certainty Applied to Contributory Copyright Infringement 
In Grokster, the plaintiffs sought a clarification of the Sony rule, but 
the Court refused to provide one.205 The explanations provided by the 
Restatement clarify that rule and the substantial certainty limitation 
provides a point of balance between the interests of copyright owners 
and the public’s interest in technological innovation. For example, if a 
product has no conceivable use but copyright infringement, the company 
that markets and produces that product will be held liable.206 At the other 
extreme, if a product has only noninfringing uses, the company that 
markets and produces that product will never be liable. The problem, as 
revealed by the circuit split and the Supreme Court’s reluctance to 
address the issue, comes about when a product or service is capable of 
both infringing and noninfringing uses. In those cases, the pragmatic 
software engineer or inventor will know to a substantial certainty that his 
product will, at some point, be used by another to infringe. However, just 
as a railroad may escape liability for personal injuries substantially 
certain to occur, the distributor of such a product may also escape 
liability by way of the substantial certainty limitation. 
The substantial certainty limitation should not be confused with an 
exemption. Instead, it is a net through which the courts may filter those 
cases that fall into the gray area between the two extremes. The 
substantial certainty limitation is a balancing test; if an industry knows to 
a substantial certainty that its operation could result in harm, the court 
weighs that knowledge against the public benefits that industry provides. 
If the industry provides a net social benefit, it should enjoy limited 
                                                                                                             
 204 See Leichtman v. WLW Jacor Comm., Inc., 634 N.E.2d 697, 699 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1994) (“[W]hen [the defendant] intentionally blew cigar smoke in [the plaintiff]’s face, 
under Ohio common law, he committed a battery.”). 
 205 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2778 (“[W]e do not revist Sony further, as MGM requests, 
to add a more quantified description of the point of balance between protection and 
commerce when liability rests solely on distribution with knowledge that unlawful use 
will occur.”). 
 206 As the Court notes, “[W]here an article is ‘good for nothing else’ but infringement, 
there is no legitimate public interest in its unlicensed availability, and there is no injustice 
in presuming or imputing an intent to infringe.”  Id. (citing Canda v. Michigan Malleable 
Iron Co., 124 F. 486, 489 (6th Cir. 1903)). Similarly, such activity is encompassed by the 
Restatement’s discussion of intent. Certainly one who develops and distributes a product 
only capable of harmful consequences evinces either a purpose to cause harm or the 
knowledge to a substantial certainty that such harms will come about. 
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liability. However, the limitation does not allow all industries to escape 
liability, nor does it allow all producers of products and services capable 
of infringement to escape liability as a contributory infringer. The 
limitation promises that certain software companies may escape liability, 
while others may not. The difficulty has always been deciding where to 
draw the line between the interests of copyright holders and the public’s 
interest in technological innovation. The substantial certainty limitation, 
thus, eases the “difficult balance.”207 
In some cases, a company, like Sony, or the proprietor of P2P 
networks, such as BearShare, Limewire, eDonkey, iMesh, eMule, and 
BitTorrent, may analogize to those industries and instances noted in the 
Restatement. P2P networks provide a public service. Like the railroad 
and airline industries, which facilitate the free flow of commerce and 
communication on a national and global scale, P2P networks facilitate 
the free flow of trade and ideas on a global scale.208 Many corporations 
utilize P2P networks.209 Due to reduced transaction costs, entrepreneurs, 
previously excluded from the global market, now have access.210 Justice 
Breyer’s concurring opinion also specifically lists many of P2P 
networks’ uses that promote communication.211 In addition to the public 
benefits, copyright owners may profit from this technology. Artists, who 
otherwise may have had a smaller audience, can now reach an Internet-
savvy global community.212 Furthermore, as Justice Breyer noted, 
“[t]here may be other now-unforeseen noninfringing uses that develop 
for [P2P] software, just as the home-video rental industry (unmentioned 
in Sony) developed for the VCR.”213 In light of these social benefits, the 
proprietors of P2P networks may qualify for the substantial certainty 
limitation; technological innovation will not be chilled. 
Nevertheless, the limitation does not save industries that know to a 
substantial certainty that their conduct may harm specific victims or 
                                                                                                             
 207 Sony, 464 U.S. at 429. 
 208 See Timothy K. Andrews, Comment, Control Content, Not Innovation: Why 
Hollywood Should Embrace Peer-to-Peer Technology Despite the MGM v. Grokster 
Battle, 25 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 383, 410 (2004). 
 209 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2770. 
 210 Andrews, supra note 208, at 410-11 (citing Brief of Appellee Grokster, Ltd. at 18-
20, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-55894 
and No. 03-55901)). 
 211 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2790 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 212 See id. at 2789 (noting Grokster’s network included “[a]uthorized copies of music 
by artists such as Wilco, Janis Ian, Pearl Jam, Dave Matthews, John Mayer, and others”); 
see also Andrews, supra note 208, at 411 (“[W]hen AOL Time Warner’s Reprise 
Records refused to release the album Yankee Hotel Foxtrot by the band Wilco, the band 
turned to P2P and distributed its album free of charge. . . . Soon after, Wilco signed with 
Nonesuch Records . . . and the album went gold on May 20, 2003.”). 
 213 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2790 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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persons in a localized area. This distinction furthers the goals of the 
substantial certainty limitation. Rather than punishing pragmatism, the 
limitation focuses liability on those who evince a subconscious, 
blameworthy desire to cause harm. The proprietors of P2P networks may 
have knowledge to a substantial certainty that their software will 
facilitate the infringement of particular copyright holders’ work. For 
example, in Grokster and Aimster, the defendants listed Top 40 tracks for 
download.214 The Napsters, Groksters, and Aimsters of the world are 
substantially certain, based on the popularity of those songs, that users 
will download Top 40 songs without thinking of the royalties lost to the 
copyright holder. Their certainty has a clear element of wrongfulness, 
unlike that of the railroad industry, Sony, or even other software 
providers. According to the substantial certainty limitation, those 
software distributors are thus liable as contributory copyright infringers. 
Of course, only the particular copyright holders, within that small class 
of victims, could take action against the software provider. Thus, the 
interests of the copyright holders counterbalance against the social 
interest in technological innovation. 
Ultimately, when applying the Restatement’s theory of intent as 
well as its limitations to contributory copyright infringement, two 
scenarios result in liability. One, which should be familiar, occurs when 
an entity purposefully induces copyright infringement. The Supreme 
Court provided a laundry list of questionable conduct committed by the 
defendants in Grokster.215 Although the Court did not decide the facts of 
the case, it hinted that such conduct equated to purposeful inducement.216 
The proprietor of a P2P network, such as Grokster, does not escape 
liability in that context and the interests of the copyright holders are 
served. The second scenario comes about when an entity distributes a 
product (or provides a service) capable of both infringing and 
noninfringing uses. In the latter instance, the substantial certainty 
limitation focuses liability on entities with a culpable mind state. First, 
the question is whether “the defendant has knowledge to a substantial 
certainty that [its] conduct will bring about harm to a particular victim, or 
to someone within a small class of potential victims.”217 If the answer is 
yes, then the analysis stops and the defendant faces liability based on its 
intent to cause harm. If the answer is no, the court must balance the 
social benefits derived from the product against the harm it produces. If 
                                                                                                             
 214 Id. at 2774 (majority opinion); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645-
46 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 215 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2781-82. 
 216 Id. at 2782. 
 217 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001). 
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the product or service creates a net social benefit, the court should limit 
liability: society’s interest in technological innovation is served. If the 
product or service does not, the court must impose liability: copyright 
holders are protected. Thus, the substantial certainty limitation clarifies 
the Sony rule for the courts entrusted with the duty of balancing artists’ 
and society’s competing interests. 
CONCLUSION 
In the future, when faced with the need to clarify the Sony rule, the 
lower courts should look to tort law and apply the substantial certainty 
limitation, because it provides the balance between the public’s interest 
in technological innovation and the rights of copyright holders. The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the need to balance those 
interests and recently entrusted that duty with the lower courts. The 
substantial certainty limitation does not resolve the split between the 
Seventh and Ninth Circuits, because only action by Congress or the 
Supreme Court can correct that divergence. The substantial certainty 
limitation, however, clarifies the Sony rule for the lower courts not bound 
by precedent. It focuses liability on those who evince a blameworthy 
intent to cause harm and protects those industries that support the public 
interest. Applying the substantial certainty limitation, the court should 
ask two questions. First, the court must ask if “the defendant has 
knowledge to a substantial certainty that [its] conduct will bring about 
harm to a particular victim, or to someone within a small class of 
potential victims.”218 If the answer is yes, than the defendant is culpable 
and must face liability. If the answer is no, a court must balance the 
social benefits derived from the product against the harm it produces. If 
the product or service creates a net social benefit, a court should limit 
liability: society’s interest in technological innovation should be served. 
If the product or service does not, the court must impose liability: 
copyright holders should be protected. Ultimately, the substantial 
certainty limitation provides the clarification of the Sony rule that has 
been lacking for twenty years. 
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